We consider an attacker-operator game for monitoring a large-scale network that is comprised of components that differ in their criticality levels. In this zero-sum game, the operator seeks to position a limited number of sensors to monitor the network against the attacker who strategically targets a network component. The operator (resp. attacker) seeks to minimize (resp. maximize) the network loss. To study the properties of mixed-strategy Nash Equilibria of this game, we first study two simple instances: When component sets monitored from individual sensor locations are mutually disjoint; When only a single sensor is positioned, but with possibly overlapping monitoring component sets. Our analysis reveals new insights on how criticality levels impact the players equilibrium strategies. Next, we extend a previously developed approach to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium in the general case. This approach uses solutions to minimum set cover and maximum set packing problems to construct an approximate Nash equilibrium. Finally, we implement a column generation procedure to improve this solution and numerically evaluate the performance of our approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Critical infrastructure networks such as water distribution or power networks are attractive targets for malicious attackers [1] , [2] . In fact, successful attacks against these networks have already been documented [3] , [4] , amplifying the need for development of effective defense strategies. An important part of a defense strategy is attack detection [5] , which can be achieved by deployment of sensors to monitor the network [6] - [8] . However, if a network is large, it is expected that the number of sensors would be insufficient to enable monitoring of the entire network. Hence, the problem that naturally arises is how to strategically allocate a limited number of sensors in that case.
We adopt a game theoretic approach to tackle this problem. So far, game theory has been used for studying various security related problems [9] - [15] , including the ones on sensor allocation. The existing works considered developing both static [16] - [18] and randomized (mixed) monitoring strategies [7] , [8] . Our focus is on randomized strategies, which are recognized to be more effective than static when the number of sensors to deploy is limited [7] , [8] .
Our game model is related to the one in [7] . The network consists of the components that can be attacked, and sensor locations can be selected from a predefined set of nodes. From each node, a subset of components can be monitored. However, while [7] studies the game where the players (the operator and the attacker) make decisions based on so-called detection rate, in our game the decisions are made based on the component criticality. This game model is motivated by the risk management process, where one first conducts a risk assessment to identify the critical components in the system, and then allocates resources based on the output of the assessment [5] . Particularly, the operator seeks placing a limited number of sensors to minimize the loss that is defined through the component criticality, while the attacker seeks to attack a component to maximize it.
A monitoring strategy we aim to find is one that lies in a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game. Since our game is a zero-sum game, a NE can be calculated by solving a pair of linear programs [19] . However, these programs are challenging to solve in our case, since the number of actions of the operator grows rapidly with the number of sensors she has at her disposal. Moreover, a NE calculated using this numerical procedure usually does not provide us with much intuition behind the players' equilibrium strategies. Our objective in this work is to: (i) Study how the components' criticality influences the equilibrium strategies of the players; (ii) Investigate if some of the tools from [7] can be used to calculate or approximate an equilibrium monitoring strategy for our game in a tractable manner.
Our contributions are threefold. Firstly, for a game instance where component sets monitored from individual sensor locations are mutually disjoint, we characterize a NE analytically (Theorem 1). This result provides us with valuable intuition on the equilibrium strategies, and reveals some fundamental differences compared to the game from [7] . Particularly, the result illustrates how the components' criticality influences strategies of the players, that the resource-limited operator can leave some of the noncritical components unmonitored, and that the attacker does not necessarily attack these components. We also extend some of the conclusions to a game instance where a single sensor is positioned but the monitoring sets are allowed to overlap.
Secondly, we prove that the mixed strategies proposed in [7] can be used to obtain an approximate NE. In this approximate NE, the monitoring (resp. attack) strategy is formed based on a solution to a minimum set cover (resp. maximum set packing) problem. A similar approach for characterizing equilibria was also used in [13] - [15] , yet for specific models and player resources. Similar to [7] , we show that these strategies may represent an exact or a relatively good approximation of a NE if the component criticality levels are homogeneous. Additionally, our analysis reveals that the approximation quality decreases if the gap in between the maximum and the minimum criticality level is large, which is a novel insight compared to [7] .
Finally, we discuss how to improve the set cover monitoring strategy from the above-mentioned approximate equilibrium by using a column generation procedure (CGP) [20] . This procedure was suggested in [7] as a way to improve the set cover strategy, but it was not tested since the strategy performed well. We show that CGP can be applied in our game as well, and test it on benchmarks of large-scale water networks. The results show that: The running time of CGP rapidly grows with the number of deployed sensors, but the procedure can still be used for finding an equilibrium monitoring strategy for water networks containing several hundred nodes; Running a limited number of CGP iterations can considerably improve the set cover monitoring strategy.
Organization. Section II introduces the game. Section III discusses two special game instances. Section IV shows that the strategies from [7] can be used to obtain an approximate NE, and discusses how the monitoring strategy from this approximate equilibrium can be improved. Section V contains a numerical study. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. GAME DESCRIPTION
Our network model considers a set of network components E = {e 1 , . . . , e m } that can be potential targets of an attacker, and a set of nodes V = {v 1 , . . . , v n } that can serve as sensor locations for the purpose of monitoring network components. By placing a sensor at node v, the network operator can monitor a subset of components E v ⊆ E, which we refer to as the monitoring set of v. Without loss of generality, we assume E v = ∅, and that every component can be monitored from at least one node. If sensors are positioned at a subset of nodes V ⊆ V, then the set of monitored components can be represented as
To study the problem of strategic sensor allocation in the network, we adopt a game-theoretic approach. Specifically, we consider a zero sum game Γ = {1, 2}, (A 1 , A 2 ), l , in which Player 1 (P1) is the operator and Player 2 (P2) is the attacker. P1 can select up to b 1 nodes from V to place sensors and monitor some of the network components in E. We assume that these sensors are protected, in that they are not subject to the actions of P2. P2 seeks to select a component from E to attack. We assume that if P1 successfully detects the attack, she can start a response mechanism to mitigate the damage. Thus, in our model, the attack is successful only if it remains undetected by P1. Based on the discussion, the action set of P1 (resp. P2) is
where w e ∈ (0, 1] is a known constant whose value indicates the level of criticality of the component e; the assumption w e > 0 is without loss of generality. For practical purposes, for each e ∈ E, w e can be evaluated as the normalized monetary loss to P1, negative impact on the overall system functionality when the component e is compromised by P2, or a combination of several factors. We assume that P1 (resp. P2) seeks to minimize (resp. maximize) l.
The players are allowed to use mixed strategies. A mixed strategy of a player is a probability distribution over the set of her pure actions. Particularly, mixed strategies are defined as
is a mixed strategy of P1 (resp. P2), and σ 1 (V ) (resp. σ 2 (e)) is the probability with which the action V (resp. e) is taken. One interpretation of mixed strategy σ 1 for P1 is that it provides a randomized sensing plan; similarly for P2. For example, in a day-to-day play in which both players play myopically, P1 (resp. P2) selects a sensor placement (resp. an attack) plan according to sampling from probability distribution σ 1 (resp. σ 2 ).
In the analysis that follows, it is convenient to characterize σ 1 through the marginal probabilities
Particularly, ρ σ1 (v) is the probability that a sensor is placed at v if P1 plays according to σ 1 . Next, given (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ∈ ∆ 1 × ∆ 2 , the expected loss is defined by
We use L(V, σ 2 ) (resp. L(σ 1 , e)) to denote the case where σ 1 (V ) = 1 (resp. σ 2 (e) = 1). We are concerned with strategy profile(s) that represent a NE of Γ. A strategy profile
, holds for all σ 1 ∈ ∆ 1 and σ 2 ∈ ∆ 2 . We refer to L(σ * 1 , σ * 2 ) as the value of the game. Thus, given that P2 plays according to σ * 2 , P1 cannot perform better than by playing according to the randomized monitoring strategy σ * 1 . Similar argument holds for P2's randomized attack strategy σ * Yet, these LPs can be computationally challenging to solve using standard optimization solvers for realistic instances of Γ. Namely, since the cardinality of A 1 rapidly grows with respect to b 1 , so does the number of variables (resp. constraints) of LP 1 (resp. LP 2 ). In the following section, we provide structural properties of equilibria for two simple but instructive cases. Subsequently, we discuss an approach to compute -NE, and then discuss how to further improve the monitoring strategy from this -NE.
III. EXACT EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES
In this section, we first study the game instance in which the monitoring sets are mutually disjoint. We then analyze the game in which the monitoring sets can overlap with each other, but P1 can only use a single sensor (b 1 = 1).
A. Mutually Disjoint Monitoring Sets
We first derive a NE for an instance of Γ where the monitoring sets are mutually disjoint, that is, E vi ∩ E vj = ∅ hold for any two distinct nodes v i and v j . For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let e * i denote the component from E vi with the largest criticality w e * i . One can identify such a component for each of the monitoring sets, and assume without loss of generality w e * 1 ≥ . . . ≥ w e * n . For a given number of sensors b 1 , we define Z(b 1 ) as follows:
We argue that this set determines the nodes on which P1 places sensors in a NE. Particularly, let p be the largest element of Z(b 1 ), E p ={e * 1 , . . . , e * p }, S p = p i=1 1/w e * i , and (σ * 1 , σ * 2 ) be a strategy profile that satisfies
In Theorem 1, we show that this strategy profile is a NE.
Theorem 1. Let E vi ∩ E vj = ∅ hold for any two distinct nodes v i and v j from V. Then: (i) There exists at least one strategy profile (σ * 1 , σ * 2 ) that satisfies (4)-(5); (ii) Any strategy profile (σ * 1 , σ * 2 ) that satisfies (4)-(5) is a NE of Γ. Proof. We refer the reader to [22, Lemma 1, Theorem 1].
We now discuss the equilibrium strategies defined in (4) and (5) . From (4), we see that the probability of P1 placing a sensor at node v j depends on the corresponding maximum criticality w e * j : the higher w e * j is, the higher the probability of placing a sensor at v j is. This is intuitive since more critical components should be monitored with higher probability by P1. Additionally, P1 places sensors only on the first p nodes. If p < n, nodes v p+1 , . . . , v n are never allocated any sensor, and hence, the components from E vp+1 , . . . , E vn are never monitored. This is in contrast with the result from [7] , where it was shown that P1 monitors every component with nonzero probability in any NE. Indeed, in our proof, we show that criticality of the unmonitored components is lower than the value of the game. Another interesting observation is that the set of nodes on which sensors are allocated also depends on the number of sensors P1 has at her disposal. Particularly, the more sensors P1 has, the more nodes she allocates sensors on, as shown in the following proposition. Proposition 1. Let b 1 ∈ N and b 1 ∈ N be given, and p (resp. p ) be the largest element of Z(b 1 ) (resp. Z(b 1 )).
Proof. We refer the reader to [22, Proposition 1] .
From (5), we see that P2 targets only the components from E p . Thus, the unmonitored components are not necessarily targeted in equilibrium. Indeed, P2 on average gains more by attacking components from E p , even though they may be monitored by P1 with a non-zero probability. Next, observe that the components from E p with higher criticality are targeted with lower probability. The reason is that P1 monitors high criticality components with a higher probability, which results in P2 targeting these components with a lower probability to remain undetected. Finally, note that the set of components P2 attacks with positive probability is nondecreasing with the number of sensors P1 decides to deploy; this follows from Proposition 1.
B. Overlapping Monitoring Sets and Single Sensor
To better understand if some of the conclusions from Section III-A can be extended to the case of overlapping monitoring sets, we discuss the case where b 1 = 1. Consider the following primal and dual linear programs: These problems are reformulations of LP 1 and LP 2 [19, Section 2] . Under the reasonable assumption that P1 cannot monitor all the components using a single sensor, (P) and (D) are bounded. Moreover, thanks to strong duality, their optimal values coincide. Let x * be a solution of (P), y * be a solution of (D), and J * be the optimal value of these programs. Then the following strategy profilē
is a NE of Γ (see [22, Proposition 2] ). To understand P1's equilibrium strategy, note that x * v can be viewed as a scaled probability of inspecting v. By inserting x * into the constraints of (P) and dividing them by J * , we obtain {v∈V,Ev e} x * v /J * ≤ L(σ * 1 ,σ * 2 )/w e , for every e ∈ E. One can now verify that the left-hand side of this inequality is the probability of not monitoring e. Thus, if w e ≤ L(σ * 1 ,σ * 2 ), then P1 can leave e unmonitored. Otherwise, P1 monitors e with non-zero probability. Additionally, the higher w e enforces the lower probability that e is left unmonitored. Note that these observations are similar to the ones we made for the case discussed in Section III-A.
Next, y * e can be interpreted as the scaled gain that P2 achieves by targeting e. By inserting y * into the constraints of (D), and dividing them by J * , we obtain {e∈E,e / ∈Ev} y * e /J * ≥ L(σ * 1 ,σ * 2 ), for every v ∈ V. The lefthand side of the inequality represents P2's payoff once P1 monitors v, so the constraints guarantee that P2's payoff is at least 1/J * . Next, P2's objective is to minimize e∈E y e /w e , so she has more incentive to increase y e for which the corresponding criticality w e is higher. Thus, if a group of components appears in the same constraints of (D), P2 would prioritize targeting the component with the highest criticality from this group. This is consistent with the attack strategy (5) , where P2 targeted the components from E p .
IV. APPROXIMATE EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES
In this section, we show that the mixed strategies developed in [7] can be used to obtain an -NE for Γ, and discuss a way to improve the monitoring strategy from this -NE. We begin by introducing necessary preliminaries.
A. Preliminaries
We first define set packings and set covers, which are two essential notions that we use subsequently.
(2) A maximum set packing, if |E | ≤ |E| holds for every other set packing E . Definition 2. We say that V ∈ 2 V is: (1) A set cover, if E V = E; (2) A minimum set cover if |V | ≤ |V | holds for every other set cover V .
Set packings are of interest to P2. Namely, each of the components from a set packing needs to be monitored by a separate sensor. Thus, by randomizing the attack over a set packing, P2 can make it more challenging for P1 to detect the attack. Similarly, set covers are of interest for P1. In fact, if P1 is able to form a set cover using b 1 sensors, she can monitor all the components. In that case, Γ is easy to solve in pure strategies (see [22, Proposition 3] ). A more interesting and practically relevant situation is one in which P1 is not able to monitor all the components simultaneously due to limited sensing budget. Therefore, we henceforth assume that P1 cannot form a set cover using b 1 sensors; i.e. b 1 < |V | holds for any set cover V ∈ 2 V .
B. Set Cover/Set Packing Strategies
We now introduce the mixed strategies constructed using the notion of minimum set cover and maximum set packing. Particularly, let V * (resp. E * ) be a minimum set cover (resp. a maximum set packing), and n * := |V * | (resp. m * := |E * |). Following [7] , we consider the mixed strategies σ 1 and σ 2 characterized by
In other words, P1's strategy is such that each node in V * is allocated a sensor with probability b1 n * . Since V * is a set cover, it follows that every component is monitored with probability at least b1 n * . The strategy of P2 is to attack each component from E * with probability 1 m * . The proof of existence of a strategy profile (σ 1 , σ 2 ) satisfying (7)-(8) is by construction, and can be found in [7, Lemma 1] .
Let us define w min := min e∈E w e , w max := max e∈E w e , ∆ w := w max − w min , and
The following theorem establishes that (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is an -NE, and gives the worst case values for and P1's loss.
Theorem 2. Any strategy profile that satisfies (7)- (8) is an -NE of Γ, where = 1 + 2 . Furthermore, we have
Proof. We refer the reader to [22, Theorem 2] . From Theorem 2, we can draw the following conclusions. If all the components have equal criticality level, then ∆ w =0 and 2 =0. In that case, 1 =0 if n * =m * , and (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is an exact NE. Although n * =m * may look as a restrictive condition, it turns out that n * and m * are often equal or close to each other in practice [7] . Also note that the strategy profile constructed using (7)-(8) differs from the equilibrium profile developed in Section III-A in two aspects: (i) Since V * is a set cover, every component is monitored with nonzero probability; (ii) The set of nodes where sensors are placed (resp. the set of attacked components) does not change with b 1 , that is, it is always V * (resp. E * ).
Yet, if ∆ w is large, can be large even if n * = m * , which is a novel insight compared to [7] . Namely, the strategies σ 1 and σ 2 are developed for the game where the players make decisions based on so-called detection rate [7] . In that setup, each of the network components is assumed to be equally important. Hence, the strategies do not take into consideration criticality levels of network components, which is the reason they may fail.
For instance, consider the case from Fig. 1 . We have V * ={v 1 , v 2 }, E * ={e 1 , e 3 }, the criticality of blue (resp. red) components is w min (resp. w max ), and b 1 =1. From Fig. 1 a) , we see that by using the strategy σ 1 , P1 monitors e 1 and e 3 with equal probability although they have different criticality levels. Thus, the best response of P2 is to target e 3 , which results in the worst case loss of P1. Similarly, as seen in Fig. 1 b) , by using the strategy σ 2 P2 targets the components e 1 and e 3 with equal probability. The best response of P1 is then to monitor e 3 , leaving P2 with the lowest payoff.
Nevertheless, the set cover strategy σ 1 has several favorable properties. Firstly, we note that by playing σ 1 , P1 cannot lose more than (9) . Thus, if b 1 is close to n * , the worst case loss (9) and approach 0, and σ 1 represents Fig. 1 : The figure illustrates why the strategies σ 1 and σ 2 may fail. The criticality of red (resp. blue) components is wmax (resp. w min ). a good approximation for equilibrium monitoring strategy. Secondly, this strategy is easy to construct. Once V * is known, one can straightforwardly find σ 1 that satisfies (7) (see [7, Lemma 1] ). Although calculating V * is an NP-hard problem, modern integer linear program solvers can obtain a solution of this problem for relatively large values of n and greedy heuristics can be used for finding an approximation of V * with performance guarantees [21] . Finally, σ 1 can be further improved by using a Column Generation Procedure (CGP), as explained next.
C. Improving Set Cover Monitoring Strategies
We now briefly explain how to improve the set cover monitoring strategy σ 1 using CGP. We refer the interested reader to the Appendix of the extended version [22] for more detailed treatment. We begin by rewriting LP 1 in the form minimize σ1≥0,z1≥0
where A is a matrix representation of Γ. Here, every element of σ 1 corresponds to a possible pure strategy from A 1 . Since the number of pure strategies grows quickly with b 1 , we cannot directly solve (10) due to the size of the decision vector. However, the number of inequality constrains is always m, which allows us to use CGP to solve (10) .
The first step of CGP is to solve the master problem (MP), which is obtained from (10) by considering only a subsetÃ 1 of pure strategies. Hence, to form MP, we only generate columns of A that correspond to variablesÃ 1 . In our case, we initializeÃ 1 with the pure strategies that are played with non-zero probability once P1 employs the set cover monitoring strategy σ 1 (see [7, Lemma 1] for construction of these strategies). Once a solution (z * 1 ,σ * 1 ) of MP is calculated, one solves the sub-problem
where (ρ * , π * ) is a dual solution of MP and a V is the column of A corresponding to a pure strategy V ∈ A 1 . If the optimal value of (11) is negative,z * 1 can be decreased. We then add a solution of (11) toÃ 1 , and proceed to the next iteration. Otherwise,z * 1 (resp.σ * 1 ) is the value of the game (resp. an equilibrium monitoring strategy), and we end the procedure.
The key point of CGP is to be able to solve (11) efficiently, which is not necessarily the case for every linear program. However, in the case of LP 1 , A is determined based on the loss function l and has a structure that allows us to obtain a solution and the optimal value of (11) by solving a binary integer program (see the problem (21) in [22] ). This program has n + m binary decision variables and m + 1 constrains for any b 1 , so it can be solved efficiently for relatively large values of n and m using modern solvers. This allows us to use CGP to find or approximate an equilibrium monitoring strategy for the networks of relatively large size, as shown in the next section.
V. NUMERICAL STUDY
We now test CGP on benchmarks of large-scale water networks ky4 and ky8 [23] . These networks can be modeled by a directed graph. The vertices of the graph model pumps, junctions, and water tanks. The edges model pipes, and the edge direction is adopted to be in the direction of the water flow. We consider attacks where P2 injects contaminants in a water network, while P1 allocates sensors to detect contaminants. In this case, E are the locations where contaminants can be injected, and V are the locations where sensors can be placed. We adopt E and V to be the vertices of the water network graph. The monitoring sets are formed as follows: if a water flow from contamination source e passes through v, then e belongs to E v [24] . Criticality w e in this case can characterize the normalized population affected by contaminants injected in e [25] . For simplicity, we generated w e randomly. We remark that n = m = 964 (resp. n = m = 1332) for ky4 (resp. ky8) network.
We first measured how much time it takes to construct the set cover monitoring strategy σ 1 , and to further improve it to an equilibrium monitoring strategy using CGP. We considered ky4 and ky8 networks, and varied b 1 . The results are shown in Fig. 2 . Notice that the longest running time was 1180 seconds, which demonstrates that CGP may allow us to improve σ 1 to an equilibrium monitoring strategy for the networks of relatively large size. However, we also see that the running time rapidly grows with b 1 and the network size. This indicates that this way of calculating an equilibrium monitoring strategy may become inefficient if the network size exceeds several thousand nodes.
Therefore, we also explored how much we can improve σ 1 by running only a limited number of iterations of CGP. We considered ky8 network, and adopted b 1 = 150. As the performance metric, we used the ratio d(i) :=L(i)/L(σ * 1 , σ * 2 ), whereL(i) is the optimal value of the master program after i iterations. The valueL(i) upper bounds the value of the game, and represents the worst case loss of P1 if she uses a monitoring strategy obtained by running i iterations of CGP. Hence, if d(i) = 1, thenL(i) = L(σ * 1 , σ * 2 ), and CGP recovers an equilibrium monitoring strategy after i iterations.
The plot of d and the execution time with respect to the number of iterations is shown in Fig. 3 . Same as in the previous experiment, the execution time includes the time to construct the set cover monitoring strategy σ 1 . Although initially d(0) ≈ 2, d reaches the value 1.11 after 700 iterations. We also indicate that the running time to achieve this improvement was 391 seconds, which is approximately 3 times shorter compared to the time to obtain an equilibrium monitoring strategy for b 1 = 150. This indicates that even if CGP may not be used to improve σ 1 to an equilibrium monitoring strategy, we can still significantly improve this strategy by running a limited number of CGP iterations.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated a network monitoring game, with the purpose of developing monitoring strategies. Our analysis revealed how criticality levels impact a NE, and outlined some fundamental differences compared to the related game [7] . Particularly, the operator can leave some of the components unmonitored based on their criticality and available budget, while the attacker does not necessarily need to attack these components. Next, we proved that previously known strategies [7] can be used to obtain an -NE, and showed how depends on component criticality. Finally, we discussed how to improve the monitoring strategy from this -NE using the column generation procedure.
The future work will go into two directions. Firstly, we will work on characterizing and analyzing properties of a NE in the general case of the game. Secondly, we intend to generalize the game model by relaxing some of the modeling assumptions. For instance, we will allow the attacker to target several components simultaneously, and will remove the assumption that deployed sensors are perfectly secured.
